2012-6 Today\u27s Standards and Yesterday\u27s Economics - Two Short Occasional Essays: Eliminating History from Economic Thought and Mark Blaug on the Quantity Theory by Laidler, David
Western University
Scholarship@Western
Economic Policy Research Institute. EPRI Working
Papers Economics Working Papers Archive
2012
2012-6 Today's Standards and Yesterday's
Economics - Two Short Occasional Essays:
Eliminating History from Economic Thought and
Mark Blaug on the Quantity Theory
David Laidler
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsepri_wp
Part of the Economics Commons
Citation of this paper:
Laidler, David. "2012-6 Today's Standards and Yesterday's Economics - Two Short Occasional Essays: Eliminating History from
Economic Thought and Mark Blaug on the Quantity Theory." Economic Policy Research Institute. EPRI Working Papers, 2012-6.
London, ON: Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario (2012).
   
   
   
   
Today's Standards and Yesterday's 
Economics - Two Short Occasional Essays 
Eliminating History from Economic 
Thought and Mark Blaug on the Quantity 
Theory  
by  
David Laidler  
   
Working Paper # 2012-6                             November 2012 
 
   
    
Economic Policy Research Institute 
EPRI Working Paper Series  
   
Department of Economics  
Department of Political Science 
Social Science Centre  
The University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario, N6A 5C2  
Canada  













          Eliminating History from Economic Thought1  
 
                                                        by 
 




Abstract: Formal analysis, in which maximizing agents use today's "true" 
model of the economy to form expectation upon which they then base their 
behaviour, trivializes the role of the future in economic life and ignores the 
possibility that the past's models, which helped generate the data against 
which today's models are tested, differed from the latter. Such analysis 
denies that economics has a relevant history, and its current dominance 
explains the decline of the history of economic thought within the discipline.      
 
JEL Classifications A10, B10 
 
Keywords, Time, Progress, Empirical Evidence, True Model, Rational 





                                                 
1 After-dinner speech, delivered in mid-Bosphorus on May 21st 2011, in acceptance of 
honorary membership in the European Society for the History of Economic Thought at 
the Society's annual conference in Istanbul. Helpful discussions with Harald Hagemann 
and Hans-Michael Trautwein are gratefully acknowledged, but I am entirely responsible 
for any boredom or other adverse reactions generated by what follows. 
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Fears for the Future of the History of Economic Thought 
This honorary membership brings me great pleasure. Some of my colleagues 
think of me as a monetary economist who has sought refuge in the history of 
economic thought (HET hereafter) as his ideas have become unfashionable, 
and perhaps they have a point, but that isn't the way that I think of myself. 
HET constituted a large and compulsory segment of my undergraduate 
education at the LSE, and along with monetary economics it was one of my 
two fields of specialization as a Ph.D student at Chicago. Moreover, my first 
paper in the field, on Thomas Tooke, though not published until 1972, was 
actually written in 1965-66, within 18 months of the completion of my 
degree, and I had no qualms about including it in my (1975) collection of 
essays on then current issues involving money and inflation. In short, I 
learned long ago that its own history is an integral part of monetary 
economics, and I have never drawn a sharp distinction between the two 
areas.  
 But my pleasure tonight is tempered by the apprehension that many of 
us feel about HET's future. Though matters are not so far gone in Europe as 
in North America, its serious study as a branch of economics seems to be in 
decline everywhere. So tonight I want to sketch out a monetary economist's 
suggestions about why the academic mainstream - please forgive this label, 
but I don't have a better one - has recently wandered so far off course in its 
treatment of HET, but also about why the inevitability of the end of history 
within economics might just be an intellectual illusion created by a certain 
way of doing the subject that is itself perhaps on its way to becoming part of 
that history.. 
 This topic is well suited to a long and boring lecture, but our 
President, Harald Hagemann, has warned me that, if I talk for longer than 
fifteen minutes, my honorary membership will be revoked. Since I really do 
value it, I shall take full advantage of the conventions of a brief after-dinner 
talk to be assertive and to avoid all intellectual nuances.     
 
The Myth of Orderly Progress in Economics 
It is not news that today's mainstream believes economics to be a science 
which makes orderly progress, that old ideas which are still useful are in the 
current body of knowledge, and that those which are not there have 
disappeared because they are not useful. Paul Romer's rather condescending 
view, expressed to Snowden and Vane in 1999, that "ancestor worship as a 
research strategy [is] probably. . .unproductive. But as a consumption 
activity it…can be fun" is widely held, and though it might leave HET an 
honourable place in general undergraduate education, or even in the graduate 
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history of science curriculum - which has probably been just as well for the 
area's survival in recent years - it excludes it quite firmly from any serious 
economics program.  
 This view has always been around, of course, but it has taken hold 
with increasing strength over the last four decades. It should not have done 
so, because over this same period its falsity was quite evident. Now as ever, 
it is closer to the very complicated truth to describe economics as a subject 
in which new ideas do sometimes turn up, but in which old ones also 
regularly reappear in various disguises and for various reasons, seldom if 
ever disappear entirely or achieve complete dominance, and usually, though 
not always, are sharpened up a little along the way.  
 Consider a few examples: the quantity theory of money seems to have 
begun its modern journey in 16th century Salamanca, and after much coming 
and going to have arrived in Chicago in the 1950s and 60s on its way to a 
prominent  position in monetary policy in the 1970s and  80s, before sinking 
into today's (probably temporary) obscurity; the two interest rate approach to 
discretionary monetary policy, with which the quantity theory sometimes 
crossed paths,  began its wanderings in 18th century Stockholm and Regency 
London, passed through Sweden again in the 1890s, only to vanish in the 
1930s and then re-emerge at the turn of the millennium in the research 
departments of all those inflation targeting central banks; and, more broadly, 
the reputation of the "market" as a way of organizing economic life has 
regularly risen and fallen over two and a half centuries, and has continued to 
do so since the early 1970s.  
 Economics makes much use of arguments whose logic is either sound 
or not, and it sometimes develops potentially refutable empirical predictions 
as well. These attributes surely give it some claim to be classified as a 
science; but a science which makes, and always has made, orderly and 
unidirectional progress? In which almost forgotten ideas from the past never 
have nor ever will take on renewed relevance? And in which there never was 
nor ever will be anything to be gained from some familiarity with its own 
history? Please! As the old English saying puts it: "Pull the other one, it's got 
bells on"            
    But over the last thirty or forty years, this is what more and more 
economists have come to believe, and with growing confidence too, making 
HET's position within the discipline increasingly precarious. Surely, the rise 
and prevalence of these beliefs in the face of so much contrary empirical 
evidence needs explanation, and because this is a historical phenomenon 
within economics, those of us who still take HET seriously had better try to 
find one. Here, I confess that I am getting a bit out of my depth – when I 
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first inserted this phrase into my notes, I had no idea that I would be 
speaking in mid-Bosphorus! - but since I have a sympathetic audience, at 
least for about another ten minutes, let me offer a few conjectures.  
 
The Future and the Past in Present Day Economics 
I suggest that the very approach to economic theory which has been 
increasingly widely taught, particularly in the monetary area, since the early 
1970s –  rational expectations modeling and all that, itself one of those 
successful new sets of ideas that do indeed turn up from time to time - 
presents a serious barrier to observing, let alone, comprehending, the facts 
presented by the subject's own history, and that this is because it has turned 
that particular view of the discipline's scientific nature already mentioned 
into an axiom upon which economics itself is founded.  
 In his recent book, The Age of Fracture Daniel T. Rodgers (2011) 
discusses the development of American social, political and economic ideas 
since the early 1970s, and notes that this has been marked by the widespread 
and persistent creation of wrinkles in time into which matters of history as 
well as intellectual and institutional evolution tend to disappear. I have no 
qualifications that would allow me to judge the overall validity of Rodgers' 
analysis, but it certainly seems to fit recent developments in American 
economics even better than he thinks.  
 That theories based on the idea that agents form and act upon rational 
expectations derived from their knowledge of a true model of the economy 
fold the economy's future into its present is a phenomenon that has already 
attracted a good deal of critical attention. We've all long known that the 
assumption of perfect foresight totally eliminates the distinction between 
present and future, and that the rational expectations hypothesis gets as close 
as one can to the same outcome while still permitting the construction of 
explicitly dynamic models that have the potential to mimic what happens in 
the real world as real time passes there. We've also known for some time 
that this hypothesis, and the clearing markets assumption that goes with it, 
excuses its exponents of any need to pay attention to what Keynes called the 
"dark forces of time and ignorance". Whether this should be regarded as a 
boon or not is a matter of considerable and still ongoing controversy, though 
let me remark in passing that I for one have felt increasing qualms about it 
lately.   
 But mainstream economics does strange things to the relationship of 
the present to the past as well, and these are less widely noted. At first sight, 
the past seems to matter quite a lot to the forward looking agents who 
inhabit today's models. It has left behind endowments of productive 
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resources to which they can apply inherited technology, as well bequeathing 
an institutional framework defining property rights and the terms on which 
they can be exchanged, not to mention knowledge of the "as if" true model 
that is the basis of the expectations that inform their choices. Had these 
starting conditions come by way of a big bang at the instant we encountered 
these agents, however, everything would be the same, because the processes 
by which they came to exist in the past are irrelevant to the way in which 
agents deploy them in the present, which is, as I have noted already, 
completely forward looking.   
 Furthermore, and crucially, mainstream economic theory became 
explicitly self-referential with the rise of the rational expectations 
hypothesis. Today's archetypical model teaches that the economy behaves 
the way it does because, among other things, the agents inhabiting it use that 
very same model to devise their strategies. But this incorporation of the true 
model of the economy into its own structure has transformed the hypothesis 
that economics is a science that makes unidirectional progress from just one 
among several ideas about how the subject develops into the only one 
tenable by exponents of modern theory, and hence has ensured the 
simultaneous spread among them of the view that HET cannot be integral to 
the discipline.    
 The past may be the only source of data against which economic 
hypotheses can be tested or calibrated, but data never speak entirely for 
themselves. They need to be interpreted though a theory. When the only 
theory deemed suitable for this purpose embodies itself as part of its own 
structure, even on an "as if" basis, then that structure is inevitably projected 
onto the past, and other perspectives on the historical record are obscured  
The "as if" element here does perhaps leave a little room for HET, but only 
for an ultra-Whig version of it that focuses on the increasing mathematical 
sophistication with which economists have analyzed the same old questions 
and answers about economic life that their theory insists have always 
informed agents' behaviour. To adapt Bob Lucas’s deservedly well known 
(1980) remark - "to ask why the monetary theorists of the 1940s did not 
make use of the contingent claim view of equilibrium is. . .like asking why 
Hannibal did not use tanks against the Romans instead of elephants"  - it is 
as if the history of warfare has to be confined to tracing the slow but steady 
technical evolution of the battle-tank from the war-elephant. This might be 
an interesting story, but whether it is enough to occupy the whole history 




The Self-referential Nature of Economics 
I persist in thinking that the key to getting mainstream economics to begin 
paying attention again to the intellectual diversity and ambiguity that is at 
the heart of HET lies, first of all, in embracing wholeheartedly its insights 
that economic ideas are self referential and that they do indeed affect 
economic behaviour, but, second, in insisting that when the actual outcome 
of the application of some particular set of ideas deviates from what they 
have led their exponents to expect, this dissonance be taken seriously and 
followed up.  
 As I have often argued before, the real world is inhabited not by 
representative agents but by diverse ones who practice the division of 
labour, and those who create the economic ideas that inform economic 
activity are called economists. HET is the history of their activities, and it 
teaches us that there never has been a single economic theory which has also 
been the undisputed common property of all agents, let alone a theory that 
was also agreed to be clearly true - let's not get diverted so late in the 
evening into discussing what this last phrase might mean! HET tells stories 
about the continuous interaction and evolution of competing and often 
contradictory theories that have not only influenced behavior, but have also 
been influenced by its consequences, as events have forced agents to rethink 
old ideas and conjecture new ones.  
 Today's mainstream monetary economics, with its reliance on clearing 
markets and rational expectations, has surely earned a permanent place in 
the subject’s history, but as an important part of the story of its ongoing 
evolution, not as an end-point whose achievement has rendered what went 
before it irrelevant to understanding what is now happening. The idea that 
political history came to an end at some time during the Reagan 
administration – another example that Rodgers cites of time-wrinkling, by 
the way – did not last long in the face of the evidence generated in the years 
that followed. Perhaps the economic crisis that began in asset markets in the 
summer of 2007, and whose consequences continue to reverberate, is now 
forcing a similar reconsideration of the ideas that blinded so many to its 
approach, and perhaps also helped to create its preconditions.  
 If such reconsideration does take hold, then HET's decline over the 
last three or four decades will itself turn out to have been yet another 
example, albeit on a large scale, of the way in which economic ideas almost 
disappear from time to time, only to resurface again as people begin to find a 
new use for them. Let us at least hope so, and, given tonight's occasion, 
demonstrate our optimism by raising another glass of wine to the prospect as 
well.       
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My Encounters with Mark      
I first met Mark Blaug in the early 1960s in the UK, though I'm not sure 
exactly when or where. No matter: at that time, Mark was already a well 
established scholar of whose work I had been aware even as an 
undergraduate. He was thus something of an authority figure in my 
intellectual landscape, and also, as I look back, he became an example as 
well, though I can't claim to have been immediately conscious of this. Mark 
was passionate about the history of economics, not as a separate field of 
study, but as an integral part of the discipline. So am I, at least as far as 
monetary economics is concerned. I have never dared to range as widely 
Mark did, but I must have acquired this way of looking at things from 
somewhere, and in addition to our personal interactions, I was certainly a 
regular user in my teaching of various editions of Economic Theory in 
Retrospect (Blaug 1962) which it permeates.2  
 In the '60s and '70s, when I was in the UK, I saw Mark often, and after 
moving to Canada, still regularly though less frequently, because for some 
years we went to many of the same conferences on both sides of the 
Atlantic. I always looked forward to our encounters, though sometimes with 
just a little trepidation. Mark was habitually direct and you always knew 
where he stood. One of my later memories of him is from the 2002 HES 
meeting at Davis. As a discussant I defended Robert Leeson's suggestion – 
see Leeson (2003) - that his recent discovery in Milton Friedman's notes that 
the Treatise on Money (Keynes, 1930) had figured prominently in the 
monetary theory course the latter had taken from Lloyd Mints in 1932-3 
provided some support for an innocent explanation for Friedman's (1956) 
attribution of a very Keynesian theory of the demand for money to an 
alleged Chicago oral tradition. Mark was in the room, and the expression on 
his face that this provoked took me back for just for a moment to some of 
my earliest encounters with him, when I had learned so much, sometimes the 
hard way. But this expression quickly gave way to a resigned smile. Even 
Mark mellowed as he got older! 3 
 Mark's directness meant that his praise could be taken seriously, and I 
still get great pleasure from knowing that he liked my (1991b) paper "The 
                                                 
2 All quotations from this book appearing here are from the 4th edition (1985) 
3 I still think Leeson had a point. Friedman's first (1956) reference to that Chicago tradition was more of 
rhetorical flourish than a carefully considered proposition about history, and he would hardly have been the 
first student to treat a particular feature of his department in a particular year as indicating more about the 
overall longer run tone of the place than it really did. And Friedman was not a monetary specialist when a 
student. That the Treatise played a prominent role in Mints' course that year is confirmed by Rose 
Friedman in Friedman and Friedman (1998, p. 38) 
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quantity theory is always and everywhere controversial – why?" Not only 
did he tell me so, but he also paid me the compliment of making it a starting 
point for a paper of his own on the same topic (Blaug 1995). I should have 
taken up this conversation at the time and tried to carry it further, but I was 
fully occupied with other projects, and I let the opportunity slip. But better 
late than never: my tribute here to Mark is a discussion of how his (1995) 
paper on the quantity theory both illustrates the strengths of his general 
approach to the History of Thought, but also poses a particular puzzle in his 
handling of one episode that was of particular concern to me at the time, and 
which perhaps reveals a certain limitation to that approach.    
 
Mark's Approach 
Mark's approach to the History of Economic Thought is summed up in the 
very title of his great textbook: Economic Theory in Retrospect. It was 
indeed a book about economic theory, not economic policy or economic 
philosophy - this is one reason why my students, who were always B.A. 
honours majors or M.A candidates enrolled in otherwise very technical 
programs, liked it, I think; and it was retrospective because Mark knew that 
if we are to understand today's version of any theory, a knowledge of its past 
is at least helpful and more likely essential. He offered his book as "a critical 
study" too, where "Criticism implies standards of judgment, and my 
standards are those of modern economic theory" (p. 1).  
 Even so, Mark was always careful not to project contemporary 
economic ideas onto the past along with contemporary standards. He knew 
that his "innocent sentence" about the latter obscured a multitude of 
difficulties. These arose, first because the standards themselves were the 
product of history, and were prone to change over time, but second because 
"The development of economic thought has not taken the form of a linear 
progression towards present truths. While it has progressed, many have been 
the detours imposed by exigencies of time and place".(p.7) A full 
understanding of those detours required that the exigencies in question be 
acknowledged, but sometimes these lay beyond the boundaries that today's 
standards laid down for the subject, and Mark was a bit hesitant to cross 
those boundaries, "If, in the chapters that follow, there is little about 
Zeitgeist, social milieu, economic institutions and philosophical currents, it 
is not because these things are unimportant, but because they fall outside of 
the scope of our enquiry" (p. 7) My students liked this too, but here I was, 
and still am, less comfortable.    
      
      
 11
 
When it came to monetary economics, as with the rest of 
contemporary economics, Mark believed that ". . .  as it is now conceived [it] 
is . . .what it is because of the entire trajectory of received economic 
doctrines; . (1995, p.1); and the quantity theory of money provided him with 
the ideal context in which to demonstrate the advantages of studying the 
history of an economic theory as a means of achieving a fuller understanding 
of today's version of it. There were also lessons here that were relevant 
beyond the boundaries of monetary economics: ". . .this oldest of economic 
theories is also one of the most misunderstood economic doctrines . . . we 
can learn a great deal about what are called "theories" in economics by 
studying the history of the quantity theory. (p, 28)   
 Though Mark was generous in suggesting that his (1995) essay was 
addressing the same questions as mine – why has the quantity theory always 
been controversial? – in fact it went deeper in one direction, asking why the 
theory had lasted so long in the first place, what that longevity itself might 
have to tell us about its current standing, and what all this revealed about the 
nature of economic theories more generally.  I had tended to take the 
theory's longevity for granted, and hence had neglected the issues this fact 
raised. But on another matter, the reasons for its habitually being 
controversial, Mark said little explicitly; this even though he was skeptical 
about the monetarism to which it was so central and which was still 
prominent in the intellectual landscape when he was writing his essay, and 
despite the fact that his respect for the quantity theory itself was mixed with 
a good deal of exasperation about not only the company it was then keeping, 
but also about the intellectual quality of many of its earlier manifestations as 
well.  
 Even so, these latter qualms did not prevent him concluding: "The 
point is, and perhaps this is my main point, that if we believe that the 
quantity theory of money is true, it is not because we find the theory 
underlying it so plausible and precisely expressed that we feel compelled to 
assent to it. It is facts and not analytic rigor that make the quantity theory 
good economics. I venture to assert that this is so with most if not all 
economic theories" (1995. p. 44)  
 In this assessment, we have a succinct expression and application of 
the of the standards that Mark had discussed explicitly in Economic Theory 
in Retrospect, and always guided his work on the History of Economic 
Thought; but here we should recall that though he referred to those standards 
as "today's", the "today" in question is now three decades or so into the past. 
They were dominated by a style of "positive economics" that stressed 
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empirical content, and have by now been widely superseded among the 
discipline's "mainstream" by an insistence on analytic precision and rigor as 
ends in themselves.4 Mark was no intellectual Luddite, and he certainly 
believed that analytic precision in the statement of a theory had a lot to be 
said for it, but only when this quality made the task of bringing facts to bear 
in assessing a theory easier rather than harder. If it did not, then he was 
willing to tolerate a good deal more in the way of logical looseness to 
achieve empirical relevance than would pass muster in 2012, not least 
among monetary economists.  
 
The Importance of Empirical Content 
If these later standards were brought to bear on Mark's work then, including 
his study of the quantity theory, it could be made to look muddled, but Mark 
himself would have had a strong defense against such a verdict. His well 
known skepticism about modern formal analysis already marked passages of 
his (1995) paper and would play a more prominent role in some of his later 
writings – e.g. (1997, 2001) – and it did not stem from a failure on his part to 
value analytic precision in the expression of economic ideas, let alone of a 
refusal to move with the discipline's times. Rather it reflected a deeply held 
and well thought through belief that the pursuit of analytic precision for its 
own sake was leading economics away from, rather than towards, greater 
empirical relevance, and that the times were therefore moving in the wrong 
direction.  
 Thus Mark's conclusion that the quantity theory's longevity stemmed 
from it being good empirical economics was quite consistent with the 
scathing denunciation of the imprecision with which it had routinely been 
expressed over the centuries that also appears in his (1995) paper. "At the 
end of our story, we are struck by the failure of just about every quantity 
theorist to provide any rigorous statement of the theory. Wicksell and Fisher 
are the best of them . . . [but] an almost indescribable analytic sloppiness 
characterized some 200 years of development in monetary theory." (p. 43)  
 Prominent among Mark's requirements of  economic theories of any 
vintage was that they provide clear instructions about how to bridge the 
divide between the logical time inherent in their formal specifications and 
the real time in which the data they were intended to explain were generated, 
and here he found the record of the quantity theory particularly deficient. As 
he showed at considerable length, the theory had been understood for 
                                                 
4 A discussion of the precise nature of Mark's positivism could easily occupy a much longer study than this 
one in its own right. I hope it suffices here to note that it was closer to that of Richard Lipsey (1963) than 
Milton Friedman (1956)  
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centuries to yield two predictions: first that, in the long run, the price level 
would move in proportion to the quantity of money, and leave real variables 
unaffected – the "notorious proportionality theorem" (p. 20) as he branded 
this idea of neutral money –  and second that, in the short run, changes in the 
quantity of money would have systematic real effects. But these predictions 
raised two further questions: how long was that short run likely to last? And 
if the quantity of money was continually growing, would non-neutralities 
persist for ever?  
 The only attempt to answer the first of these questions that Mark 
could find in 200 years of literature was by Friedman, who put the duration 
of significant non-neutralities in the wake of monetary shocks at anything 
between 3 to 10 years (see p.42). But Friedman's answer came accompanied 
by his natural unemployment rate hypothesis, and this made Mark 
uncomfortable, not only because this hypothesis contradicted David Hume's 
apparently affirmative answer to the second of Mark's two questions about 
non-neutralities, but also because vagueness about the time interval over 
which it was supposed to hold made it difficult to bring empirical evidence 
to bear on settling this difference between Hume and Friedman, perhaps to 
the point of putting the scientific status of the natural rate hypothesis in 
doubt.  
 In Mark's view, then, the advent of Friedman's version of the doctrine 
of money's super-neutrality had not necessarily been a step in the right 
direction as far as the quantity theory's empirical relevance and hence 
scientific value were concerned. He would return to this matter later (See 
Blaug,2001) when he criticized Robert E. Lucas (1996) for reading New-
classical views of the quantity theory's place in modern general equilibrium 
theorizing about macroeconomics into the past, as a by-product of his 
overall claim that progress in these matters since Hume had lain solely in 
applying successively refined analytic techniques to the same old substantive 
issues: "It does not seem to occur to Lucas that this is not how the quantity 
theory of money was interpreted by Hume or anyone else in this golden age 
before the rational expectations revolution of the 1970s" (2001, p. 155)  As 
Mark had remarked in (1995) "The object of the quantity theory from its 
very outset in Hume's formulation was to demonstrate that the absolute size 
of the quantity of money was of no real significance in an economy" (p. 29), 
not to expound the claims to super-neutrality that lay at the heart of Lucas's 
contributions. 
 It was surely Mark's resistance to theoretical formalism that made him 
unwilling to attribute more precision to the quantity theory, considered over 
the sweep of its history, than was embodied in a prediction that "In any 
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monetary regime, any dramatic and unexpected increase in the quantity of 
money will in due course raise prices, although not necessarily in the same 
proportion – that is all the quantity theory of money amounts to", and to add 
immediately and approvingly, "Nevertheless, painting with a broad brush, 
the quantity theory is supported by an overwhelming body of empirical 
evidence" (p.43)        
 
The Quantity Theory's Controversial Nature 
Mark thus explained the longevity of the quantity theory by applying his 
own customary standards for judging any economic theory to this task: he 
boiled down its essentials to an empirical prediction that had barely changed 
over the years, compared that prediction to evidence, and found the theory 
broadly validated. But in so doing, and as I have already noted, he didn’t 
directly address that other question which had concerned me in (1991b), the 
reason for the perpetually controversial nature of that theory during its long 
life. He did of course have a good deal to say about some of the empirical 
controversies that had dogged the quantity theory over the years, particularly 
those repeated debates about "reverse causation" and money's endogeneity 
more generally, matters that I had also discussed and are still with us today. 
And, as I had also done me, Mark drew attention to controversies about the 
stability of the demand for money function, which look rather different 
today than they did even in 1995.5  
 But Mark stopped short of extending his discussion of these 
controversies to their implications for deeper differences of opinion about 
the capacity of market mechanisms to function spontaneously in keeping the 
real economy working, even though, as did point out explicitly, acceptance 
of the quantity theory's usefulness presupposes a significant degree of faith 
in this capacity. Presumably he did not venture further here in observance of 
a self imposed prohibition on straying too deeply into matters of "Zeitgeist, 
social milieu, economic institutions and philosophical currents," because it is 
indeed hard to stay out of this territory when questions about the stability 
and efficiency of the market economy are raised.   
 This reticence didn't matter much for most aspects of Mark's analysis 
of the evolution (or lack thereof) of the internal logic of the quantity theory 
of money and what empirical evidence had to say about its practical 
relevance. But monetary economics, like economics in general, is concerned 
with the workings of institutions that enable societies to function, and it has 
                                                 
5 Problems with institutional change within the monetary sector were already becoming apparent in the 
mid-1980s, as Geoffrey Wood (1995) discussed in some detail. But see below pp. 11-12 for further 
discussion. 
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a great deal to say that is relevant to the political choices among them that 
have to be made. The evolution of the quantity theory's relationship to these 
broader issues is thus also part of its history. A very special set of beliefs 
about the overall socio-economic order is required to make one comfortable 
with a version of monetary theory that reduces it to a means of making 
predictions about the relationship between the quantity of money and the 
prices level; not all of these beliefs of are matters of positive social science; 
and many of them are very controversial indeed. But an explicit analysis of 
such beliefs has to be part of any assessment of the quantity theory's 
standing within the broader corpus of monetary theory, let alone economic 
theory more generally, and to any understanding of how this has evolved.         
 
The Theory's Golden Age 
This was a point I was trying, rather timidly, to get at in (1991b) in 
discussing the reasons for the quantity theory's perpetually controversial 
nature, and Mark's failure to follow me into this territory did affect our 
treatments of at least one important episode in the quantity theory's history. 
Specifically, in choosing a title for my (1991a) book, I had labeled the 
period running roughly from 1870 until the outbreak of World War 1 The 
Golden Age of the Quantity Theory, and Mark commented as follows on this 
choice: "Was this the Golden Age of the Quantity Theory? No, say some, 
because the golden age was also the era par excellence of the international 
gold standard . . . " (p. 55)  whose basic mechanisms rendered the quantity 
theory operationally irrelevant.  
 Though Mark didn't explicitly include himself among the 
abovementioned "some", he didn't exclude himself either, and his 
ambivalence here is closely related to two other features of his treatment of 
the quantity theory's development during this period: first his suggestion that  
"so far as the quantity theory is concerned, the Marginal Revolution of the 
1870s might just as well never have happened" (p. 34) and, second,  his 
failure to discuss explicitly the bimetallic controversy that began in the same 
decade – though he did of course cite some of the literature that was its by-
product.  
 Now in terms of Mark's own critical standards, and the limits they 
imposed, his judgments on these two salient events of this period are 
understandable and even defensible. To be more specific, though Don 
Patinkin (1995), was right to point out that the modern agenda associated 
with the integration of monetary and value theory to which he himself had 
contributed so much had after all begun with Walras and Marshall, Mark too 
was right to note, relying heavily on Patinkin's own earlier work, that this 
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agenda had in fact made little progress that was relevant to the way in which 
the quantity theory itself was presented until the 1920s. And on the policy 
front, the practical consequence of the bimetallic controversy had after all 
been to leave the gold standard, one of whose essential roles was to ensure 
that " nominal stock of money in small, open economies . . . was adjusted to 
the level of prices via the balance of payments, so that the quantity theory 
was simply irrelevant" (p. 35) more deeply entrenched than it ever had been.  
 However, if little change took place in the quantity theory's properties 
as a piece of economic theory, or in its relationship to the actual conduct of 
monetary policy between 1870 and the outbreak of World War 1, its place 
within the body of monetary theory, and more specifically within the theory, 
as opposed to the practice, of monetary policy as well, changed dramatically. 
Quite simply, the marginal revolution rid mainstream economic theory of the 
cost of production theory of value, and hence monetary theory of the idea 
that, under a commodity standard, the price level was determined by the cost 
of production of the monetary metals. Thus an explanation of the price level 
which, as Mark's own essay documents so well, had been the quantity 
theory's long-standing competitor for over a century was removed from the 
scene, and it was left as the only one remaining.  
 As a consequence, though it took a while for this change to be 
digested, it became impossible to present the gold standard as the 
embodiment of a naturally ordained monetary order and to defend it as such 
in political debates. Even for its advocates, it now had to be treated as a 
monetary regime to be chosen or rejected on its merits in a competition with 
others, a competition whose rules were for while defined solely by the 
quantity theory because no other source of such rules was available. As 
shifts in the Zeitgeist etc. have gone in the history of western civilization, the 
demise of the gold standard as a component of a naturally ordained 
economic order may not have been of the first order of magnitude, but surely 
it qualifies as such an event. It is hard to imagine either the debates about 
rules and discretion in monetary economics that dominated American 
discourse in the 1920s and 1930s and culminated in Simon's (1936) classic 
work on these issues, or the extraordinarily rich literature on the role of 
monetary policy that was so prominent in the early years of the Great 
Depression developing as they did, had the cost of production theory of the 
value of metallic money not lost its scientific respectability and been 
replaced by the quantity theory between the 1870s and 19146.  
                                                 
6 Of course the quantity theory did not retain its monopoly on intellectual respectability within monetary 
theory for very long. As Leijonhufvud (1981) demonstrated, Knut Wisckell's efforts – eg 1898 – to adapt it 
to the circumstances of  economies dominated by banking systems soon led to a body of theory, largely 
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 These factors explain why this period, which was indeed, as Mark 
pointed out, the heyday of the gold standard in the economy itself, 
nevertheless seemed to me to merit being labeled a golden age for the 
quantity theory. There was, of course an intended touch of irony in my title 
as well, which many commentators, including Mark I'm afraid, missed, but 
more important than this, they also missed the dramatic change in the 
quantity theory's intellectual standing to which this title was intended to 
draw attention.  
 
The Ideological Element in the History of Monetary Economics 
I have already noted that, to put it now (almost) in Mark's own words, the 
quantity theory depended upon ". . . three propositions: (a) the exogeneity of 
the money supply; (b) the stability of the demand-for-money function; and 
(c) the real determin[ation] of the level of output or transactions" (p. 41).7 
Each one of these is surely empirically testable on its own merits, at least in 
principle, and it is indeed this property that makes the quantity theory a 
theory. But, as I have also noted, discussions of his third proposition (c) can 
quickly stray beyond the boundaries of positive economics into ideological 
territory and dispassionately convincing tests of it can be hard to generate. 
This is why throughout the quantity theory's history there has always been 
more at stake in the interpretation of empirical evidence than the 
determination of the price level. 
 This was at least as true of the monetarist episode during which Mark 
and I actually wrote our papers as of the golden age just discussed, when the 
quantity theory became so deeply embroiled in populist politics that Irving 
Fisher felt impelled to write The Purchasing Power of Money to restore it to 
respectability in sound money circles or indeed as of many others in its long 
history. It was no accident that in (1970) Joan Robinson, an exponent of a 
political theory of inflation based on ideas about struggles over income 
shares between social classes, and hence also a leader of the post-Keynesian 
revival of assaults on what I have argued above are the inevitably 
ideologically charged propositions about the inherent stability of the real 
economy summarized in Mark's proposition (c) should also accuse quantity 
theorists of reading the direction of causation in their equation in the wrong 
direction, thus imbuing debate about his point (a) with political overtones as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Austrian and Swedish, within which the central question ceased to be the influence of the quantity of 
money on prices, and became instead, the influence of the rate of interest on savings and investment. And 
by the mid-1940s, it was Keynesian economics that provided the main intellectual foundations for the 
Bretton Woods system. 
7 Mark writes "real determinants". 
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well. Nor was it entirely co-incidental that political attacks on the 
"monetarist" policy agenda of that well know composite politician Ronald 
Thatcher should provide the ideological context for Hendry and Ericsson's 
(1983) assault on Friedman and Schwartz's (1981) handling of the empirical 
evidence bearing upon proposition (b) about the stability of demand for 
money, and so on.8  
 In short, I persist in believing that it is the ideological resonance of the 
quantity theory that has kept it controversial for so long, and perhaps also 
contributed to its longevity. If I am right here, then Mark's explanation of 
this longevity as the result of the quantity theory being good empirical 
economics is incomplete. His approach can of course be defended by 
arguing that the logical properties of any economic theory, the quantity 
theory included, and its empirical content too, exist independently of its 
ideological connections and can therefore be assessed in isolation from 
them. But this argument is at its most convincing when the evidence used to 
test a theory is also generated independently of those connections, and this is 
not true of the quantity theory.  
 Such a condition might well be met for some economic theories, but 
not monetary theories: the evidence available to test them is the product of 
the monetary policy regimes within which the policy experiments that have 
generated them were implemented, and of the reactions to those experiments 
of economic agents which were themselves conditioned by their 
expectations about how those experiments would work out. All of these 
elements are in one way or another dependent on the particular beliefs about 
the workings of the monetary system that are current at a particular time and 
place; and this fact in turn implies that the empirical messages conveyed by 
any particular experience about the validity of any particular monetary 
theory, the quantity theory included, depend not just how that theory is 
formulated today, but on how or even whether that same theory was 
formulated when the evidence being brought to bear on it today was 
generated. 
 I didn't argue this point in 1991, but more recently I have (e.g. Laidler 
2003) and if there is something to it, then it has implications about why, but 
also how, we should study our subject's history. These implications do not 
contradict the principles that Mark deployed in discussing the quantity 
theory in 1995, but perhaps they do require them to be extended. As he 
argued, it certainly helps to know where a theory has come from if we are to 
                                                 
8 The fact that a version of this same paper appeared eight years later in a much more accessible academic 
source than the original – See  Hendry and Ericsson (1991) - has tended to distract attention from its 
original political context.  
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understand today's version of it, and, pace my fellow monetary economists 
in their devotion to formal rigor, I remain in complete accord with him that 
the ultimate test of a theory's value lies in its ability to explain empirical 
evidence. But in interpreting such tests, it also helps to know not just where 
the theory under test has come from, but also what if anything some earlier 
version of it had to do with generating the evidence being deployed. Since 
ideological elements often condition the monetary policy environment, and 
also the specific actions of policy makers and private sector agents alike, 
those awkward questions of "Zeitgeist, social milieu, economic institutions 
and philosophical currents" that Mark habitually set to one side, can have a 
significant role to play in assessing the significance of particular data sets for 
a theory, and hence the future course of its history. 
 
 A Recent Example                                               
Let me end with a single illustration of what I have in mind here, drawn 
from recent experience. Though the effects of institutional change on the 
nature of the demand for money function that had become so evident by the 
time Mark was writing certainly played a role in causing central banks to 
retreat from money growth targeting, it was not these effects alone that 
caused the quantity theory's virtually complete disappearance from 
respectable professional discourse even as Mark was writing. At least as 
important was the failure of Milton Friedman's (e.g. 1984) very public 
quantity-theory based predictions of an imminent resurgence of serious 
inflation, an apparently straightforward consequences of – to use Mark's 
phrase - the "dramatic and unexpected increase in the quantity of money" 
that had followed the Volcker disinflation.   
 Would this failed prediction have been as decisive for the quantity 
theory's standing in academic economics had it not come from someone so 
closely and publically associated with other aspects of Ronald Thatcher's 
policy agenda? And has this ideological loaded decline in its reputation not 
had consequences for the subsequent history of monetary theory as a body of 
seemingly positive doctrine?  And did that subsequent history not in turn 
influence economic events, not least the recent crisis and the reactions of 
policy makers alike and economists to it? I would have loved to discuss 
these questions with Mark. That look he gave me at Davis in 2002 suggests 
he would have had a few instructive things to say about them and with his 
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